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Este documento propone un nuevo enfoque para mejorar el análisis y la gestión del riesgo 
financiero de una economía nacional por parte del banco central. Se basa en la teoría y práctica 
moderna del análisis de derechos contingentes (CCA, por contingent claims analysis), el que hoy 
utilizan con éxito a nivel de banco individual los gerentes, inversionistas y autoridades. Su principal 
herramienta de análisis es el balance contable ajustado por riesgos, que muestra la sensibilidad de 
los activos y pasivos externos de la empresa frente a perturbaciones externas.  A nivel nacional, los 
sectores de la economía se toman como carteras interconectadas de activos, pasivos y garantías, 
unas explícitos y otras implícitas.  Los enfoques tradicionales tienen dificultades para analizar la 
forma en que los riesgos se pueden acumular poco a poco y de repente explotar en una crisis con 
todo. El análisis CCA está preparado para capturar tales “no linealidades” y cuantificar los efectos 
de descalces entre activos y pasivos al interior de la organización y entre organizaciones. Los 
balances ajustados por riesgo CCA facilitan las simulaciones y los ejercicios de tensión para evaluar 




This paper proposes a new approach to improve the way central banks can analyze and manage the 
financial risks of a national economy.  It is based on the modern theory and practice of contingent 
claims analysis (CCA), which is successfully used today at the level of individual banks by 
managers, investors, and regulators.  The basic analytical tool is the risk-adjusted balance sheet, 
which shows the sensitivity of the enterprise’s assets and liabilities to external “shocks.”  At the 
national level, the sectors of an economy are viewed as interconnected portfolios of assets, 
liabilities, and guarantees—some explicit and others implicit.  Traditional approaches have 
difficulty analyzing how risks can accumulate gradually and then suddenly erupt in a full-blown 
crisis.  The CCA approach is well-suited to capturing such “non-linearities” and to quantifying the 
effects of asset-liability mismatches within and across institutions.   Risk-adjusted CCA balance 
sheets facilitate simulations and stress testing to evaluate the potential impact of policies to manage 
systemic risk. 
______________ 
Dale Gray is the Sr. Risk Expert for the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department  and President of MF Risk, Inc. 
and, MFRisk board members include Robert C. Merton and Zvi Bodie.  Contact information for Dale Gray is email is 
dgray@imf.org and  Dgray@MFRisk.com .  Contact information for Robert Merton is rmerton@hbs.edu and Zvi Bodie is 
zbodie@bu.edu. 
The authors would like to thank Sam Malone, Andrea Maechler, Chris Towe, Mark Swinburne, Matt Jones, John Kiff, 
Mark Levonian and Joe Zou (Taconic) for useful discussions and comments on the ideas presented in the paper.  Introduction 
  Vulnerability of a national economy to volatility in the global markets for credit, 
currencies, commodities, and other assets has become a central concern of policymakers. 
The responsibility for managing these risks at the national level often is given to the 
central bank.  However, the conventional models and analytical tools used by central 
banks today are ill suited for analyzing these types of risk.  This paper proposes a new 
approach to improve the way central banks can analyze and manage the financial risks of 
a national economy.  It is based on the modern theory and practice of contingent claims 
analysis (CCA), which is successfully used today at the level of individual banks by 
managers, investors, and regulators.  When applied to the analysis and measurement of 
credit risk, CCA is commonly called the Merton Model.
1  The basic analytical tool is the 
risk-adjusted balance sheet, which shows the sensitivity of the enterprise’s assets and 
liabilities to external “shocks.” At the national level, the sectors of an economy are 
viewed as interconnected portfolios of assets, liabilities, and guarantees—some explicit 
and others implicit.  Traditional approaches have difficulty analyzing how risks can 
accumulate gradually and then suddenly erupt in a full-blown crisis.  The CCA approach 
is well-suited to capturing such “non-linearities” and to quantifying the effects of asset-
liability mismatches within and across institutions.  Risk-adjusted CCA balance sheets 
facilitate simulations and stress testing to evaluate the potential impact of policies to 
manage systemic risk. 
 
  In addition to their traditional focus on inflation and output, central banks are 
increasingly focusing on the resilience of the national financial system.  The CCA 
framework provides a forward-looking market-based set of indicators to measure the 
vulnerability of various sectors of the economy and is well-suited to capturing non-
linearities and to quantifying the effects of asset-liability mismatches within and across 
institutions.  
 
  The paper starts with a simple framework of CCA balance sheets for four key 
sectors (sovereign, financial, corporate, and household sectors).  It describes how the 
sectoral CCA balance sheets can be constructed and linked together.  Several different 







                                                 
1 See Merton (1973, 1974, 1977, 1992, 1998).  Initially developed for valuation of corporate firms, CCA 
has been adapted to financial institutions and sovereigns. 
 
  1Contingent Claims Analysis 
A contingent claim is any financial asset whose future payoff depends on the 
value of another asset.  The prototypical contingent claim is an option – the right to buy 
or sell the underlying asset at a specified exercise price by a certain expiration date.  A 
call is an option to buy; a put is an option to sell.  Contingent claims analysis is a 
generalization of the option pricing theory pioneered by Black-Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1973).  Since 1973, option pricing methodology has been applied to a wide 
variety of contingent claims.  In this paper we focus on its application to the analysis of 
credit risk and guarantees against the risk of default.   
 
The contingent claims approach is based on three principles: (i) the values of 
liabilities are derived from assets; (ii) liabilities have different priority (i.e. senior and 
junior claims); and, (iii) assets follow a stochastic process.  The liabilities consist of 
senior claims (such as senior debt), subordinated claims (such as subordinated debt) and 
the junior claims (equity or the most junior claim).  As total assets decline, the value of 
risky debt declines and credit spreads on risky debt rise.   
 
  Balance sheet risk is the key to understanding credit risk and crisis probabilities.  
Default happens when assets cannot service debt payments.  Uncertain changes in future 
asset value, relative to promised payments on debt, is the driver of default risk.  Figure 1 
illustrates the key relationships.  The uncertainty in asset value is represented by a 
probability distribution at time horizon T.  At the end of the period the value of assets 
may be above the promised payments indicating that debt service can be made, or below 
the promised payments leading to default.  The area below the distribution in Figure 1(a) 
is the “actual” probability of default.  The asset-return probability distribution used to 
value contingent claims is not the “actual” one but the “risk-adjusted” or “risk-neutral” 
probability distribution, which substitutes the risk-free interest rate for the actual 
expected return in the distribution.  This risk-neutral distribution is the dashed line in 
Figure 1(b) with expected rate of return r, the risk-free rate.  Thus, the “risk-adjusted” 
probability of default calculated using the “risk-neutral” distribution is larger than the 
actual probability of default for all assets which have an actual expected return (μ) greater 
than the risk-free rate r (that is, a positive risk premium).
2   
 
The calculations of the “actual” probability of default is outside the CCA/Merton 
Model but it can be combined with an equilibrium model of underlying asset expected 
returns to produce estimates that are consistent for expected returns on all derivatives, 
conditional on the expected return on the asset.  The reason being that one does not have 





                                                 
2 See Merton (1992, pp.334-343; 448-450). 
  2Figure 1   
The value of assets at time t is  A(t).  The asset return process is  / AA dt t dA A μ σε =+  , where  A μ  is 
the drift rate or asset return,  A σ is equal to the standard deviation of the asset return, andε  is normally 
distributed, with zero mean and unit variance.  The probability distribution at time T is shown in (a) below. 
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Default occurs when assets fall to or below the promised  payments, t B .  The probability of default is the 
probability that   which is:  tt AB ≤
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() N i .   is the cumulative standard normal distribution.  
Shown in (b) below is the probability distribution (dashed line) with drift of the risk-free interest rate, r.  
Risk adjusted probability of default is 2 ( Nd − , where 































































Box 1             Merton Model Equations for Pricing Contingent Claims 
 
The total market value of assets at any time, t, is equal to the market value of the claims on the assets, 
equity and risky debt maturing at time T:   
 
Assets = Equity + Risky Debt 
() () () At Jt Dt = +  
 
Asset value is stochastic and in the future may decline below the point where debt payments on 
scheduled dates cannot be made.  The equity can be modeled and calculated as an implicit call option 
on the assets, with an exercise price equal to the promised payments, B, maturing in T-t periods.  The 
risky debt is equivalent in value to default-free debt minus a guarantee against default.  This 
guarantee can be calculated as the value of a put on the assets with an exercise price equal to B. 
 
Risky Debt = Default-Free Debt − Debt Guarantee 
() () ()
rT t D tB e P t
−− =−  
We omit the time subscript at t = 0. 
The value of the equity is computed using the Black-Scholes-Merton formula for the value of a call:  
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⎜⎟⎜⎟ ⎝⎠⎝⎠  and  21 dd T σ   =−
                        
r is the risk-free rate 
σ  is the asset return volatility 
N(d) is the cumulative probability of the standard normal density function below d.   
 
The formula for the “delta” of the put option is  1 ()1 Nd − . 
The yield to maturity on the risky debt, y, is defined by:         
yT DB e
− =




And the credit spread is s = y – r 
The “risk-neutral” or “risk-adjusted” default probability is 2 () N d − . 
 
Example: Assuming that:  A = $100,  σ  = 0.40 (40%),  B = $75, r = 0.05 (5%), T = 1 (one year), 
the value of the equity is $32.367, the value of risky debt is $67.633; the yield to maturity on the 
risky debt is 10.34%, and the credit spread 5.34%.  The risk adjusted probability of default is 26%.  
 




  4Financial fragility is intimately related to probability of default.  Shocks to flows, 
prices, or liquidity frequently end up being converted into credit risk in a crisis.  Default 
is hard to handle in traditional macro models in part due to assumptions which usually 
exclude the possibility of default.  In addition, flow-of-funds and accounting balance 
sheets cannot provide measures of risk exposures which are forward-looking estimates of 
losses.  CCA is a framework that explicitly includes the probability of default. 
 
Contingent Claim Balance Sheets for Sectors   
  We view an economy as a set of interrelated balance sheets with four types of 
aggregate sectors – corporate, financial, household, and sovereign.  The same general 
principles of contingent claims that apply to analysis of a single firm can also be applied 
to an aggregation of firms.  The liabilities of a firm, a portfolio of firms in a sector, or the 
sovereign (combined government and monetary authorities) can be valued as contingent 
claims on the assets of the respective firm or sector or sovereign.  The corporate sector 
refers to an aggregation of all non-financial firms.  Treating the corporate sector as one 
large firm and the financial sector as one large institution a very  simplified way of 
looking at the balance sheet but we will initially start out with this stylized framework to 
illustrate risk characteristics of the sector for the purposes of this analysis.  Later in the 
paper we will look at the major financial institutions separately and group the corporate 
firms into sub-sectors.  The key elements of the balance sheets for the corporate, 
financial, household, and sovereign sectors are shown in Figure 2.   
 
  5Figure 2 – Balance Sheets for the Corporate, Financial, Household, and 
Sovereign Sectors 
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Economy-wide Macro Contingent Claim Balance Sheets and Risk 
Exposures  
    
  Building upon the theory of contingent claims laid out above, the macrofinance 
valuation identities use put-call parity relationships, which state that the asset value A of 
each sector is equal to the value of its equity plus the value of its risky debt.
3  The four 
primary sectors of the economy, for the corporate, financial, sovereign, and household 
balance sheets, are complemented by the foreign sector.  The CCA balance sheet 
equations for each sector j have the sector assets equal to equity (i.e. junior claims) plus 
risky debt.  The function  j E  refers to the period t value of sector j’s  equity (i.e. the 
junior claim), which is modeled as an implicit call option.  The horizon period is T for the 
calculation of the implicit option values.  Risky debt,  , is equal to the default-free 





− ≡ ), minus the value of the implicit put option, 
which is denoted by   (the expected losses associated with the debt).  The time horizon 
T is the same for all sectors for the calculation of the CCA values at each point in time.  
Using the notation above, the following equations state the put-call-parity relationships 
for the four domestic sectors.  For the corporate sector (C), assets  equal equity   
plus the risky debt 
j P
C A C E
() CC B P − : 
() CC C C A EB P =+ − 
 
For the financial sector (F), assets      plus contingent financial support from the 
sovereign 
F A
F P α  equals equity  plus the value risky debt/deposits   F E (( 1 ) FF ) B P α −−  
  
(( 1 ) FF F F AP E B P αα += + − −) F  
 
F is the implicit put option to the financial sector. P
4 The model assumes that the 
government’s contingent liability, the value of the explicit or implicit sovereign 
guarantee, is a fraction α  of the total F  and the remainder, ( P 1 ) F P α − , is credit risk 
remaining in the debt and deposits of the financial sector. 
 
For the sovereign, the assets of the sovereign S include: foreign currency reserves  A MA R  
the net fiscal asset  G (defined as the present value of taxes and revenues, including 
seigniorage, minus the present value of government expenditures); and other public assets 
.  The liabilities of the sovereign include base money  and risky local-currency 
A
Other A BM M
                                                 
3 See Gray et. al. (2002) and Gapen et. al. (2004). 
4 Merton (1977) was the first to demonstrate that the government’s guarantee to banks could be modeled as 
an implicit put option. 
  7debt ( SLC SLC BP − ) and risky foreign-currency debt ( SFX SFX BP − ) and financial 
guarantees/contingent liabilities F P α  as shown below: 
 
 
() () S MA G A Other BM SLC SLC SFX SFX F RA M BP B P P A α =+ = + − + − + +  
 
For the household sector, the household asset  H A  is the sum of the household sector’s 
financial wealth  , the present value of its labor income  , and equity  FIN A L A , H RE E in real 
estate.  The debt of households to banks and non-banks is frequently tied to homes and 
real estate.  For this reason it is practical to have two segregated but linked household 
CCA balance sheets.  The “subsidiary” balance sheet would have real estate as the 
primary asset and related debt would be on the liability side.
5 The households “equity” in 
real estate is modeled as real estate assets  . H RE A  minus risky household mortgage related 
debt  ,, () H RE H B − RE P .  
  
,
., , (( ) )
L H R E















The household sector asset  H A  is equal to the household net worth   H E  plus  H c  which is 
consumption modeled as a “dividend” payment out of the household asset up to time T. 
 
  The four sector CCA balance sheets can be integrated together into an economy-
wide balance sheet as shown in Figure 3.  For each sector, the assets, plus contingent 
assets (or minus contingent liabilities), minus equity/junior claims, minus risky debt sum 
to zero (down the column in Figure 3).  These interlinked economic balance sheets 
demonstrate the interdependence among sectors; with one sector “long” a certain implicit 
option (plus sign) and another sector “short” the same implicit option (minus sign).  For 
example, the economic balance sheet of the banking sector has assets consisting of 
corporate loans (default-free debt minus the value of a put option).  The banking sector 
also includes contingent liabilities (implicit put options) from the government as an asset, 
which is an obligation (short put option) on the government’s economic balance sheet.






                                                 
5 There are many variations of this structure.  Debt could be including on the main household balance sheet  
or additional subsidiary balance sheets could be included relating specific debt obligations to related assets. 
6 Macrofinancial risk models similar to this framework have been calibrated for over 20 countries (only a 
few with the household sector, however). 







Figure 3  Economy-wide Contingent Claim Balance Sheet 
with Risk Exposures Across Sectors (Implicit Put and Call Options) 
 
  Corp Households  Financial  Sovereign  Foreign 
          

































A & L 























C B −    
F B −  
 
SFX B −  
EL 
(Put ) 






Sum  0 0  0  0  0 
 
 
The financial assets of the sectors can be separated into claims on foreigners and claims 
on domestic entities.  For simplicity, the detailed cross-holdings by the household sector, 









  9 
 
Interrelationship of Macro Financial Contingent Claim Balance Sheets, 
Risk Exposures and Traditional Macroeconomic Flows 
 
  We now show how the traditional macroeconomic flow-of-funds can be recovered 
from the CCA equations when risk goes to zero.  Note that when the volatility of assets in 
the CCA balance sheet equations (Figure 3) is set to zero, the values of the implicit put 
options go to zero.
7  The result is the accounting balance sheet of the sectors.  The flow 
of funds can thus be seen as a special deterministic case of the CCA balance sheet 
equations when volatility is set to zero and annual changes are calculated.  Note tha
the implicit put options in risky debt and contingent liabilities that allow for risk to 
transmitted between sectors in the CCA model.  Without volatility the risk transmission 
between sectors is lost.   
t it is 
be 
                                                
 
  The combined accounts – income/flow, mark-to-market balance sheets, and risk 
exposure measures – comprise the three important sets of interrelated accounts in the 
economy which are somewhat similar to the accounts in large modern financial 
institutions.
8  Risk managers would find it difficult to analyze the risk exposure of their 
firm or financial institution by relying solely on the income and cash flow statements, and 
not taking into account (mark-to-market) balance sheets or information on their 
institution’s derivative or option positions.  Country risk analysis that relies only on 
macroeconomic flow-based approach is deficient in a similar way, given that the 
traditional analysis does not take into account the volatility of assets.     
 
Measuring Implied Asset Value and Volatilities Using Market Prices 
The market value of assets of corporations, financial institutions, or sovereigns 
cannot be observed directly.  However, from the observed prices and volatilities of 
market-traded securities, one can estimate the implied values and volatilities of the 
underlying assets.
 9  These implied asset values and asset volatilities can be used to 
calibrate the pricing and risk model of major sectors in the economy.  We will discuss 
 
7   If the volatility of assets goes to zero, we have the result that in the put option formula 
 which means that the implicit put option values in the sectors go to zero.  The 
measurement of the expected loss and credit risk is not possible with asset volatility set to zero.  The 
second important observation is that if volatility goes to zero,
0 ) ( ) ( 2 1 = − = − d N d N
1 ) ( ) ( 2 1 = = d N d N , and the value for the 
junior claim of the representative sector then reduces to the accounting “net worth” equal to deterministic 
assets minus a measure of the book value of debt.  (See Gray and Malone (forthcoming) for details.) 
8 Enterprise Risk Management is a framework to comprehensively measure and manage risk in firms and 
financial institutions whose use has expanded in recent years. 
9An implied value refers to an estimate derived from other observed data.  Techniques for using implied 
values are widely practiced in options pricing and financial engineering applications.  See Bodie and 
Merton (1995). 




Firms and Financial Institutions 
 
  Domestic equity markets provide pricing and volatility information for the 
calculation of implied assets and implied asset volatility in corporate, bank and non-bank 
financial institutions.  The simplest method solves two equations for two unknowns, asset 
value and asset volatility.  Details are shown in Annex and in Merton (1974) and Crouhy 
et.  al. (2000).  Levonian (1991) used explicit option prices on bank equity to measure 
equity volatility and calibrate Merton Models for banks.  Moody’s-KMV has successfully 
applied its version of the CCA model to measure the implied assets values and volatilities 
and to calculate expected default frequencies (EDFs) for over 50,000 firms and financial 
institutions in 55 countries around the world KMV (1999 and 2001).     
 
  For unlisted corporates and banks, the relationship between the accounting 
information and the risk indicators, of companies with traded equity, can be used as a 
guide to map accounting information of companies without traded equity to default 
probabilities and risk indicators for institutions that do not have traded equity.  (An 





Since the market value of sovereign assets cannot be observed directly, a similar 
calibration procedure can be used for the sovereign balance sheet to estimate implied 
sovereign assets and asset volatility.  The prices in the international markets (including 
foreign currency market), together with information from domestic market prices, 
provide the market information for the value and volatility of certain liabilities on the 
sovereign balance sheet.
10   If we subtract the financial guarantees from both sides of the 
sovereign balance sheet at the bottom panels in Figure 2, the remaining sovereign 
liabilities are structured in a way that is consistent with the CCA framework.  On the 
simplified sovereign balance sheet, the local-currency debt of the government, held 
outside of the monetary authorities, and base money are local-currency liabilities which 
are modeled as a call option on the sovereign assets with the default barrier derived from 
the foreign-currency debt.  A simple two claim CCA framework is used to calibrate the 
sovereign balance sheet by calculating implied sovereign assets,  , and asset 
volatility.  This calibrated risk-adjusted balance sheet can be used to estimate credit risk 
in sovereign foreign-currency and local-currency debt as well as other risk indicators.  
These indicators are found to be robust measures of sovereign credit risk.
Sovereign V
 11  Scenarios 
                                                 
10 See Gray, Merton, Bodie (2002 and 2006). 
11 Applications to a wide range of countries are described in Gapen et.  al. (2004 and 2005) and Gray, 
Merton, Bodie (2007). Extensions to model the valuation of sovereign local-currency debt are described in 
Gray and Malone (2008) and Gray, Lim, Loukoianova, Malone  (2008). 
  11and simulations can be carried out to evaluate the impact of fiscal and debt management 
policies and the impact of risk transfer onto the sovereign balance sheet.  
 
 
Household Sector Balance Sheet 
 
Modeling household balance sheets using the principles of CCA is much more 
difficult than for firms, financial institutions, or sovereigns.  There is no traded equity of 
households, so techniques to use equity to imply assets are not possible.  To construct the 
household balance sheet one alternative is to use a “bottom-up” approach.  In the 
household sector, we can use macroeconomic data and information from household 
surveys to construct measures of the portfolio of household assets directly, for the most 
part, and try to estimate the volatility of household assets directly.  Household balance 
sheet assets include financial assets (pension assets, annuities, mutual funds, bank 
deposits, etc.) and estimated labor income, i.e. the present value of expected labor income 
(see Gray and Malone (forthcoming)).  For the household “subsidiary” balance sheet, 
direct estimation of the real estate prices, volatilities and debt obligations is likely to be 
the most practical (but admittedly difficult) approach.  Ideally this analysis should be 
carried out, not for one household sector, but for households segmented by income 
groups.
12   
 
Some Important Extensions and Refinements of CCA Models 
 
  Numerous extensions of the original Merton Model have been developed that 
relax certain assumptions in the original model.  These extensions are described in more 
detail in Annex but two extensions are important to mention here.  
 
  First, recent research has studied the relationship between the volatility skew 
implied by equity options and CDS spreads (Hull et. al. 2003).  They establish a 
relationship between implied volatility of two equity options, leverage and implied asset 
volatility.  This approach is, in fact, another way of implementing Merton’s model to get 
spreads and risk-neutral default probabilities directly from the implied volatility of equity 
options.  When the probability distributions derived from the option prices are negatively 
skewed (left-tailed) this means that the implied underlying asset distribution is negatively 
skewed which results in a higher probability of assets being below the distress barrier and 
thus higher spreads (Zou 2003).  In a parallel way in the sovereign CCA application, the 
probability distributions derived from FX option prices show that more negatively 
skewed FX distributions are associated with higher sovereign credit risk in emerging 
markets (See Gray, Merton, and Bodie forthcoming).  What is important about this is that 
the CCA framework is able to link information from equity and FX options to credit risk 
and spreads.  Financial stability reports usually look separately at credit risk indicators 
and probability distributions from option prices, and associated market sentiment 
                                                 
12 It may be very difficult to model households in this way due to data limitations in many countries. CCA 
balance sheets for households are not as accurate as the corporate or bank or sovereign CCA balance sheet 
models.   
 
  12indicators like the VIX.  CCA provides a structural framework linking the option price 
information to skews in implied asset distributions and thus to credit risk.   
 
  Second, the Merton Model has been extended to include stochastic interest rates.  
For example, Shimko, Tejima, and Van Deventer (1993) include a Vasicek interest rate 
term structure model which allows interest rates and term structure of interest rates to 
vary.  This closed form model, called the Merton-STV model, is a very useful extension 
which links the impact of changing interest rate levels, volatilities, and term structures to 
credit risk in financial institutions and corporations. 
 
Measuring Risk Exposures 
  So far, we have discussed how to calculate the value of risky debt, guarantees, 
and equity using the CCA approach.  We now turn to how to measure the risk exposures.  
The values of the contingent claims on the CCA balance sheets contain embedded 
implicit options which can be used to obtain certain risk measures.  These include risk 
exposures in risky debt, probabilities of default, distance-to-distress, spreads on debt, and 
the sensitivity of the implicit options to the change in the underlying asset and other 
measures.  The implicit put option increases in a non-linear way as the market value of 
the sector’s assets decline.
13  The delta measures this non-linear change in the value of an 
option per unit change in the value of the underlying asset as illustrated in Figure 4. 
  
Figure 4 










































































Put Value (LHS) Put delta absolute value (RHS)
 
For example, the government’s exposure to its guarantee to the banking sector can be 
measured with the delta of the banking sector implicit put option.  There are other 
important sensitivity measures for risk exposures.  The gamma is the change of the delta 
                                                 
13 See Draghi et. al. (2003). 
  13with respect to the underlying asset.  The vega is the sensitivity of the change in the 
implicit option with respect to a change in asset volatility.  These sensitivity measures of 
risk exposures could be useful new indicators of the potential for financial instability. 
 
Risk Transmission between Sectors  
  The framework described above is versatile and can be used to understand many 
types of crises and risk shifting that cannot as easily be analyzed with other techniques.  
The risk-transmission patterns can be dampened or may be magnified depending on the 
capital structure and linkages.  The framework can help identify situations where 
volatility gets magnified and negative feedback loops that can trigger severe crises.  The 
patterns of value and default correlation across different asset classes, sectors and 
sovereign debt values depend on these structures and links, unique to a particular 
economy.  Below are some examples of risk transmission between sectors.   
 
Risk Transmission from the Corporate Sector to the Banking Sector  
The corporate sector’s financial distress – possibly caused by stock market 
decline, recession, commodity price drops, or excessive unhedged foreign debt 
accompanied by currency devaluation – can be transmitted to the financial sector.  The 
value of the assets of the corporate sector declines, so does the value of the debt (and 




     Corporate Sector                    Banking Sector    
                               
The household sector can also transmit risk to the banking sector in a similar manner.  
The implicit put option in the banking sector derives its value from banking assets which 
have embedded put options in risky loans to borrower.  
 
Risk Transmission from the Banking Sector to the Government 
 
The banking sector’s financial distress, such as systemic banking crises and/or 
deposit runs can be transmitted to the government by increase in the value of the 
guarantees.   
 
Risk Transfer 
                      Banking Sector                                         Government              
 
Banking sector distress from non-performing loans or a deposit run can result in 




                                                 
14 See Merton and Bodie (1992). 
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Risk Transmission from the Government to the Banks and Feedback 
 
The government’s financial distress or default can transmit risk to the financial 
system.  For example, when the banking sector is holding a significant proportion of 
government securities, and there is a negative shock to the government financial position, 
it can have a detrimental impact on the banks.  The government’s implicit guarantee is 
also likely to increase.  This, in turn, makes the government financial position worse, 
creating a compounding effect, which may result in the government’s failure to honor its 
guarantee obligations and cause a collapse of the banking system.  
 
Risk Transfer 
           Banking/Financial System                                  Government           
 
 The vicious cycle could arise, when the lower value of government securities 
lowers bank assets, and raises the implicit financial guarantee, which in turn lowers 
government assets further.  A similar process could occur if banks have significant 
lending denominated in foreign exchange and a weak government position causes a 
depreciation of the exchange rate, the depreciation worsens the position of the banks 
raising the implicit guarantee, which in turn lowers government assets further.  This 
means that the implicit guarantee is higher than what is shown above.  In some situations, 
this vicious cycle can spiral out of control, eventually resulting in the inability of the 
government to provide sufficient guarantees to banks and leading to a systemic financial 
crisis. 
 
Risk Transmission from the Pension System to the Government 
 
The financial distress related to pension plans can result in the transmission of 
risk to the government. 
 
Risk Transfer 
              Pension System                                Government           
 
We assume that the pension system is a defined benefit plan which has an implicit 
government guarantee.  A decline in corporate assets would cause the corporate equity 
value to drop.  This, in turn, increases the government guarantee to the pension system 




Risk Transmission from the Sovereign to Holders of Sovereign Debt 
 
Fiscal, banking and other problems can cause distress for the government which 
can transmit risk to holders of government debt.    
                                                 
15 See Bodie (2006). 
  15Risk Transfer 
 
Sovereign                                Debt Holders  (sovereign foreign currency denominated 
debt or sovereign local currency denominated debt) 
       
Holders of foreign-currency debt have a claim on the value of the debt minus the 
potential credit loss, which is dependent on the level of assets of the sovereign (in foreign 
currency terms) compared to the foreign-currency default barrier.  Higher spreads 
demanded by the debt holders to cover the credit risk in government debt could lead to 
higher interest rates on government debt which could lead to a depreciation and feedback 
potentially further worsen the sovereign’s financial position.  
 
 
Risk Transmission from the Markets to the Household Sector and then to 
Consumption 
 
  Changes in the value of financial assets and real estate owned by households 
affect the value of household assets and have an impact on consumption.  
 
Risk Transfer 
Financial and Real Estate  
              Markets                                    Household Assets            Consumption           
 
The CCA models for households could provide useful insights into household behavior 
regarding consumption, especially how consumption changes with household asset 
volatility (and higher moments of the household asset distribution).  This is because the 
CCA captures non-linearities in the value of household debt and in the changes in 
consumption.   
 
 
Potential Highly Non-Linear Risk Transmission when Assets of One Sector are 
Linked (through Implicit Put Options) to the Assets of Another Sector 
 
  Risk is transmitted across the sectors and balance sheets through the implicit put 
options in risky debt and guarantees.  Risky debt contains an implicit put option.  If this 
risky debt is linked to the asset of another sector (e.g. through loans from the financial 
sector), the risky debt of the second sector (e.g. banks) becomes a function of the implicit 
put option of the first sector.  In other words it is a compound put option.  The compound 
nature of the implicit put options of interlinked sectors creates the potential for highly 
non-linear risk transmission.  An illustration of this is shown in Box 2.  
 
   The dynamics of the interlinked CCA risk-adjusted balance sheets provide useful 
insights into the asymmetric nature of value changes and risk transmission in business 
cycle expansions versus contractions.  In a situation of rapid economic growth, asset and 
equity values on balance sheets trend upward.  A stress event somewhere in the system 
  16can set off a chain reaction of defaults as the implicit put options are “exercised.”  The 
compound nature of the implicit put options can cause a sudden sharp decline in values of 
risky debt or sharp increase in implicit guarantees.  There is thus an asymmetry in the 
change in values in the stress or crisis period as compared to the smoother rate of change 































Box   2      Highly Non-linear Risk Exposures from Interlinked Sectors 
 
  The risky debt of sector one, S1, is the default free value of debt minus and implicit put 
option which we will assume is the asset of sector two, S2, i.e. 
11 2 )
SS S BP A −= ( .   In sector two the 
assets are equal to equity plus risky debt,
22 2 2 (
SS S S ) A EB P =+ −.  If we combine these equations and 
rearrange, we can see that the implicit put option, i.e. the present value of expected losses associated 
with the debt of  S2, is a function of the implicit put option in S1.  
() 21 1 , 2 2 () , , ,
SS S A S S P f B P volatility B r t =− , . 
  Let’s take an example of this relationship by looking at bank loans to borrowers whose risky 
debt can be modeled as default-free value of the loan minus an implicit put option (derived from the 
borrower’s asset level, asset volatility, and leverage).  The bank’s risk exposure derives from a 
compound put option since it depends on the bank assets whose value depends on the borrower’s 
risky debt.  This compound option can lead to highly non-linear risk exposures.  Let’s take a simple 
example where a bank’s assets consist 100% of risky debt to a corporate sector with promised 
payments of 100.  The Figure below illustrates how the value of the bank’s implicit put option 
increases as: (i) the corporate sector debt to asset ratio increases; and (ii) the volatility of the 
corporate assets increases.   
 
 Bank Expected Losses (implicit put option) vs. Corporate Sector Debt to Asset Ratio for 
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This means the (absolute value) of the delta of the bank’s implicit put option is high when the 
volatility of corporate assets is high and is high even when the corporate debt to asset ratio is low.  
While this is just a stylized example, the non-linear nature of the implicit put options was clearly 
evident in the Thailand crisis.  There were high levels of foreign currency denominated debt in the 
corporate sector in Thailand in 1996.  In 1997, devaluation, combined with a decline in the stock 
market and increased volatility led to widespread bankruptcies which transmitted risk to bank balance 
sheets and on to the government via the implicit guarantee.  The implicit government guarantee to the 
banking system was 3% of GDP in 1996 and increased to over 35% of GDP following the 1997 
devaluation (Gray 2001). 
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Balance Sheet Risk Framework for Stress Testing, Scenario, and 
Simulation Analysis 
 
  The economy-wide CCA model can be used with scenario, simulation, and stress-
testing analysis.  There are different levels of aggregation of the sectors, which range 
from the simple four sector model described earlier, to a model with several corporate 
subsectors, household sectors broken into different income groups, and several financial 
sector sub-sectors.  The level of aggregation depends on practical issues related to data 
availability, data reliability, and the goals of the analysis.  By simulating shocks to key 
variables, one can see how the CCA risk indicators and implicit put and call options are 
affected in other sectors.    
 
  The structure and aggregation of CCA models can be designed to analyze risk in 
major financial institutions for financial stability analysis.  Since distress in one major 
institution can impact systemic stability, it makes sense to try to model the risk for major 
institutions individually and group smaller financial institutions to keep the model size 
manageable.   
 
  There are different ways to link these financial institutions to other sectors and to 
macroeconomic variables and use the model for stress testing.  Some examples are 
described below. 
 
  Example of Financial Stability Stress-Testing with CCA Model, Factor 
Model and Macro Model – First, a CCA model is calibrated for each major financial 
institution (or groups of institutions) using equity market information and the time series 
of implied assets and risk indicators is calculated (calibration can be done using the 
Merton Model, Hull’s implementation of the Merton model, or another CCA model).  
The time pattern of asset returns of each financial institution (or of the risk indicators) 
can be used as the dependent variable in a factor model.  Key factors driving these asset 
returns could include GDP, domestic and foreign interest rates, exchange rate, domestic 
and foreign equity indices, etc.  A separate macroeconomic scenario generating model, 
e.g. a macroeconomic VAR or GVAR model,
 16 could then be used to test the impact of 
scenarios on the key factors, which feed into the financial institution’s assets.  This, in 
turn affects the credit risk indicators and the value of equity capital.
17    This stress-
testing process is described in Figure 5. 






16 VAR models used for stress testing are discussed in Hoggarth et. al. (2005). GVAR models were used to 
generate scenarios for credit risk analysis in Pesaran et. al. (2004)  and Castren et. al. (2007).   
17 The model used by Gray and Walsh (2008) is similar to this approach.  Also see IMF (2006). 
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Figure 5        Stress-testing Process 
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Macroeconomic scenarios are generated with a VAR, GVAR model
18 or other model 
(Step 1) which are used in the factor model (Step 2) for the bank’s assets to estimate 
impact on the bank’s assets (Step 3) and its credit risk (implicit put option) and on the 
bank’s equity capital (Step 4). 
 
 
  Example of Banking Stability Stress-Testing with Links to the Corporate and 
Household Sub-sectors – If there is sufficient data on corporate sub-sector and 
household sector balance sheets, a variation of the previous approach to first calibrate the 
CCA models for key financial institutions (as before) and calibrate the corporate sub-
sector and household sector CCA balance sheets.  The next step is to use data on 
exposures of banks to various sub-sectors to provide the links between bank assets and 
the risky debt obligations of the borrowers.  Risk is transmitted by the changing value of 
the implicit put options in the borrower’s risky debt.  A factor model could be estimated 
for the time-series of corporate and household sector assets returns and used in 




  Example of Stress-Testing and Assessing Capital Adequacy Using CCA 
Models of Financial Institutions – One major goal of financial sector stress-testing is to 
assess capital adequacy of various institutions under different potential shocks.  Shocks to 
financial institution assets and asset volatility and/or interest rates and other parameters 
can be used in the CCA model to measure the impact on capital adequacy.  An advantage 
of using CCA models for financial institutions is that the capital adequacy can be related 
to asset level, asset volatility, and default probability on the institution’s liabilities and 
other factors.  This way to calculate capital adequacy has been extended to include 
interest rates, interest rate volatility and correlation of asset return with interest rates by 
                                                 
18 Structural CCA model is a useful framework for understanding the co-movements of assets, equity, credit 
risk, and key volatility measures which might provide useful insights for structuring VAR models and 
designing shocks/innovations in those models. 
19 Van den End, Central Bank of the Netherlands and Central Bank of Chile. Also see Gapen et. al. (2004). 
  19van Deventer and Imai (1997, and 2003) and Belmont (2004) using the Merton-STV 
model.  
 
  The financial stress testing process commonly used by central banks and banking 
supervisors use various models to measure the change in expected default probability of 
the obligors, usually representative corporates or corporate sub-sectors.  The default 
probabilities are then used with estimates of exposure and loss given default in a model 
of bank credit losses (e.g. Credit Risk Plus) to estimate the impact on economic capital.
20  
Calibrated CCA models of financial institutions can be used to estimate capital adequacy 
without the need for detailed data on default probabilities or loss given default of 
obligors.  As pointed out by van Deventer, “In the capital allocation [using the Merton-
STV model], note that we didn’t use the probability of default or the loss given default in 
allocating capital.  We don’t need to, because the probability of default and loss given 
default are both implied by the STV model and the value of asset volatility and interest 
rate and correlation.”  This makes CCA a potentially useful tool when detailed data on 
obligor exposures, default probabilities, or loss-given-default is not available. 
 
 
Integrating Financial Risk Models and Indicators with Macro Models 
  
  Credit risk, and the market risk of the claims held in agents’ financial portfolios, 
are generally absent even in the majority of state-of-the-art macroeconomic models.  This 
omission can be serious one, because risk impacts valuation, and changes in the valuation 
of the claims held by agents, and of their net worth, impacts their decisions to spend, 
save, and invest.  Recent work has begun to address the linkage of macroeconomic and 
financial stability models.
21     
      
  In order to understand the interaction of balance sheet risk and the macroeconomy 
a promising area of future research is the integration of the financial risk analytic models 
and indicators with traditional macroeconomic models.  Such integrated models need to 
address the different mathematical nature of macroeconomic models and finance models.  
Macroeconomic models are primarily stock-flow models in discrete time and are usually 
geared to try to forecast the mean of macroeconomic variables.  Financial risk analytics, 
on the other hand, focus on the probability of  assets, following a random walk, will fall 
below a certain threshold or default barrier and therefore volatility (the second moment) 
is critical in risk analysis, not the mean (first moment).  CCA is a framework with volatile 
assets relative to a distress barrier using option pricing concepts to calculate credit risk 
indicators.  While there can be different levels of aggregation of the CCA balance sheets, 
whatever level of aggregation is chosen, the time pattern of the following could be 
calculated and used with macroeconomic models:  
 
                                                 
20 See Sorge (2004).  Work at the ECB by Castren et. al. (2007) uses MKMV median default probability for 
various corporate sectors with a VAR or Global VAR.  Also see Pesaran et. al. (2004) and Alves (2005). 
21 See Bardsen, Lindquist and Tsomocos (2006), Goodhart et. al. (2004, 2006a, 2006b), Tsomocos (2003) 
and Haldane et. al. (2007), Swinburne (2007), and IMF (2007).  
  20•  Time series of CCA balance sheet components (assets, asset volatility, distress 
barriers and implicit put  and call options) and sensitivity measures (e.g. delta and 
vega); 
•  Time series of CCA derived credit risk indicators (distance-to-distress, estimated 
default probability, CCA credit spreads, etc.).  Ways to aggregate credit risk 
indicators is described in Box 3; 
•  Time series of market indicators such as observed CDS and bond spreads or 
market risk appetite indicators (such as VIX or other indicators). 
These financial risk analytic measures can be related to the time pattern of 
macroeconomic variables using econometric techniques to study leads, lags, or 
contemporaneous correlation.  Various channels could be investigated using 
econometrics.  For example, the channel from GDP to corporate and household’s risk 
indicators, to financial sector risk indicators could be modeled.  The reverse channel from 
financial sector (balance sheets and risk indicators), to the corporate and household sector 
balance sheet
22 components, and risk indicators, and the relationship to GDP over the 
























•  Calculate the joint distribution of default probabilities in a portfolio of financial 
institutions. (For example, the joint probability modeled with the portfolio multivariate 
density developed by Segoviano).
Box 3          Aggregation of Credit Risk Indicators (CRIs)  
 
  In order to have a tractable measure of system risk for use with macroeconomic models 
and for financial stability analysis the CCA credit risk indicators of a portfolio of individual 
financial institutions (or corporate firms) must be aggregated together.  There are several ways to 
measure the system risk by aggregating the risk indicators of individual banks or institutions.   
 
•  Weight the individual default probabilities (EDFs from MKMV or other default 
probability estimate) by the implied assets of each bank/financial institution to get a 
system risk indicator.  
•  Weight the distance-to-distress for each institution by the implied assets of each 
bank/financial institution to get a system risk indicator.   
•  Use the median EDF for the sub-sector or group, e.g. as calculated by MKMV. 
•  Sum of the implicit put options of a portfolio of institutions to get the system expected 
loss for a given horizon period.  
•  Calculate an Nth to default indicator.  The time pattern of default risk indicators for a 
portfolio of individual financial institutions can be used to understand the default 
correlations and get a credit risk indicator which is the probability of N defaults over a 
specific horizon period. 
                                                 
22 The dynamics of corporate and household borrowing levels are directly related to distress barriers in the 
CCA model. 
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Financial Risk Analytic Indicators and Monetary Policy Models 
  Financial stability models and monetary stability models, by their nature, are very 
different frameworks.  There is keen interest in relating these two types of analysis, but 
no consensus on how it can be done.   
  The primary tool for macroeconomic management is the interest rates set by the 
central bank.  Simple model-based monetary policy models are widely used by central 
banks to understand macroeconomic and interest rate relationships.
23 A simple four 
module monetary policy model of this type consists of an equation for the GDP output 
gap, an equation for inflation, an equation for exchange rate and real interest rates, and a 
Taylor rule for setting the domestic policy rate.  The domestic policy rate is a short-term 
interest rate set by the central bank, such as the Federal Funds rate in the United States.   
 
  Since the economy and interest rates affect financial sector credit risk, and the 
financial sector affects the economy, an important issue is whether credit risk indicators 
(e.g. CRIs described in Box 3) should be included in monetary policy models and, if so, 
how.  Including an aggregate credit risk indicator in the GDP gap equation and testing 
whether or not the coefficient is and important first step to get a better understanding of 
how the financial sector credit risk affects GDP.  The next step could be to add a fifth 
equation relating the CRIs to GDP and interest rates (this could draw on analysis from the 
previous section relating financial risk indicators to macroeconomic variables).  
 
  Using past data, it might be interesting to include the CRI in the policy rate 
reaction function to examine whether financial stability appears to have been taken into 
account when setting interest rates in the past.  A variation of this approach is being 
investigated in research department of the Central Bank of Chile.
24  The approach taken 
in the Central Bank of Chile is to first estimate the distance-to-distress for the banking 
system (each individual bank’s distance-to-distress from a CCA model is weighted by 
bank implied assets).  The distance-to-distress for the banking system is included in the 
GDP gap equation and in the policy rate reaction function.  The model parameters are 
then estimated using historical data, including the distance-to-distress indicator.  The 
approach can be used to examine the tradeoffs between GDP, inflation, and distance-to-
distress for the banking system.
25   
 
  Outputs of the sovereign CCA model include an estimate of the risk premium on 
government local-currency debt.  The risk premium on the government local-currency 
debt is embedded in the nominal interest rate, which in turn affects the exchange rate, 
which is part of the GDP gap and inflation equations (first and second equations in the 
                                                 
23 A good summary is in Berg, Karam and Laxton (2006). 
24 Restrepo, Luna, and Gray (forthcoming). 
25 A related issue is whether an indicator of market risk appetite such as the VIX should be included in 
monetary policy models along with the credit risk indicator.  This could help estimate the impact of the 
credit risk indicator on the GDP gap, adjusted for changes in risk appetite.  
  22simple monetary policy model).  This issue is important for certain emerging market 
countries (e.g. Brazil and Turkey).
26  These are promising areas for further research.
27      
 
  A final point we will touch on is the feedback of monetary policy and changes in 
interest rates on the CCA balance sheet values and risk indicators.  CCA models that 
incorporate changes in interest rates (such as the Merton-STV model and/or factor model 
for asset return with interest rates as one factor), can be used to estimate the second round 
effects on credit risk of financial institutions in response to changes in interest rates.  
 
Conclusions   
  This paper proposes a new approach to improve the way central banks can 
analyze and manage the financial risks of a national economy.  It is based on the modern 
theory and practice of contingent claims analysis (CCA), which is successfully used 
today at the level of individual banks by managers, investors, and regulators.  The basic 
analytical tool is the risk-adjusted balance sheet, which shows the sensitivity of the 
enterprise’s assets and liabilities to external “shocks.”  The sectors of an economy are 
viewed as interconnected portfolios of assets, liabilities, and guarantees—some explicit 
and others implicit.  The CCA approach is well-suited to capturing such “non-linearities” 
and to quantifying the effects of asset-liability mismatches within and across 
institutions.  Risk-adjusted CCA balance sheets facilitate simulations and stress testing to 
evaluate the potential impact of policies to manage systemic risk.  The time pattern of 
CCA balance sheet components, risk indicators, and sensitivity parameters can be 
integrated with macroeconomic models.  The inclusion of financial system risk indicators 
and other financial risk parameters into simple monetary policy models is explored.  
                                                 
26 See Gray and Malone (forthcoming) and Favero et. al. (2003). 
27 There are several other interesting routes to take in linking risk analytics more closely with 
macroeconomic models. These include incorporating default risk and a risk premium into the Mundell-
Fleming model to separate out the effects of changes in interest rates due to changes in the market for 
liquidity, and changes in interest rates due to changes in the risk premium on debt (See Gray and Malone, 
forthcoming).  
  23Annex – Estimating Implied Assets and Volatility, Default Probabilities 
and Extensions of the Merton Model 
 
  This Annex provides details on estimating implied assets and asset volatility and 
extensions of the Merton Model.  
 
Calculating Implied Assets and Implied Asset Volatility  
 
The value of assets is unobservable, but it can be implied using CCA. 
In the Merton Model for firms, banks and non-bank financials with traded equity use 
equity, J, and equity volatility, 
J σ , and the distress barrier in the following two equations 
to solve for the two unknowns A, asset value, and  A σ , asset volatility.  (See Crouhy, 
Mark and Galai (2000)). 
 
01 2 N( ) N( ) JAd Bd =−  
1 ()
JA JA N d σσ =  
 
 
Extensions of the Merton Model 
 
  Numerous extensions of the original Merton Model have been developed that 
relax certain assumptions in the original model.  Restrictions of the model include the 
assumptions that: (i) default can occur only at the maturity date of the debt; (ii) there is a 
fixed default barrier; (iii) there is a constant risk-free rate; and, (iv) asset volatility is 
constant.  Cossin and Pirotte (2001) provide a good summary of extensions of the Merton 
Model.  Black and Cox (1976) extended the Merton Model to relax the assumptions (i) 
and (ii) above by introducing a “first passage time” model where default can occur prior 
to the maturity of the debt if the asset falls below a specified barrier function for the first 
time.   
 
  Although the strict theoretical condition in the Merton Model for default is that 
the value of assets is less than the required payments due on the debt, in the real world, 
default typically occurs at much higher asset values, either because of a material breach 
of a debt covenant or because assets cannot be sold to meet the payments (“inadequate 
liquidity”) or because the sovereign decides to default and induce a debt renegotiation 
rather than sell assets.  To capture these real-world conditions for default in the model, 
we specify a market value of total assets at which default occurs.  We call this level of 
assets that trigger default the “distress barrier.”  This barrier can be viewed as the present 
value of the promised payments discounted at the risk-free rate.  The approach used in the 
KMV model sets the barrier level equal to the sum of the book value of short-term debt, 
promised interest payments for the next 12 months, and half of long-term debt (see 
Crouhy, et. al. (2000)  and KMV (1999, 2001)).   
 
  In the 1990s the KMV model was based the VK model (Vasicek and Kealhofer) 
which has multiple layers of liabilities and several confidential features.  MKMV’s EDF 
  24(expected default frequency) credit measure is calculated using an iterative procedure to 
solve for the asset volatility.  This distance-to-distress was then mapped to actual default 
probabilities using a database of detailed real world default probabilities for many firms.  
The MKMV distance-to-distress and the CEDF (cumulative expected default 
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Note that this definition of    KMV DD  includes the real drift of the asset,  A μ , whereas the 
distance-to-distress from the Merton approach has r for the asset drift.  Since MKMV 
estimates the actual default probabilities, the risk neutral default probabilities are 
calculated from the correlation of the implied asset with the market, the market Sharpe 
Ratio, and time horizon.   
 
  The CreditGrades model (2002) includes a diffusion of a firm’s assets and a first 
passage time default with a stochastic default barrier.  The model was modified to 
incorporate equity derivatives (Stamicar and Finger 2005).  Recent research has studied 
the relationship between the volatility skew implied by equity options and CDS spreads 
(Hull et. al. 2004).  They establish a relationship between implied volatility of two equity 
options, leverage and asset volatility.  This approach is, in fact, another way of 
implementing Merton’s Model to get spreads and risk-neutral default probabilities 
directly from the implied volatility of equity options.  A similar approach using several 
equity options is discussed in Zou (2003). 
 
  The Merton Model has been extended to include stochastic interest rates as well. 
Shimko, Tejima, and Van Deventer (1993) include a Vasicek interest rate term structure 
model which relaxes assumption (iii) above allowing the risk free interest rate to change 
and including the correlation of asset return with the interest rate.  There are two 
stochastic factors, the asset and the interest rate and this model is frequently called the 
STV model.  This closed form model is a very useful extension by including the impact 
of changing interest rate term structures.  Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) take the Black 
and Cox (1976) model and add in stochastic interest rates, similar to the way STV 
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